Isabelle Duyvesteyn (2008). Great expectations: the use of armed force to combat terrorism. Small Wars & Insurgencies 19(3):328 - 351
This article looks at the use of armed force in order to stop terrorist activity. There is little agreement among experts about the importance of the use of force in past counter-terrorism campaigns. Based on limited empirical investigation, it is indicated that police and judiciary measures have been much more frequently used than the military. Concerning the effectiveness of the use of force; there are few indications that it contributes to lessening terrorism. Rather the opposite is the case; the use of force makes things worse. It complies with the aim of terrorist organizations to provoke the state into overreacting. More research is warranted into the specific conditions under which force is used. It remains possible that in very specific circumstances, military force can make a difference.
Victor Asal & R. Karl Rethemeyer (2008). Dilettantes, Ideologues, and the Weak: Terrorists Who Don’t Kill. Conflict Management and Peace Science 25(3):244 - 263
Why do some terrorist organizations choose not to—or fail to—kill? Of the 395 terrorist organizations operating between 1998 and 2005 only 39% had actually killed anyone. What factors account for this outcome? This article examines a series of organizational factors, including ideology, capability, and “home-base” country context, that the literature suggests are related to the decision to “go lethal.” We then test six hypotheses using data from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). Our statistical modeling suggests that ideology, capabilities, and “dilettantism” explain a significant proportion of the variation in whether an organization chooses to kill or not to kill. Leftists, anarchists, and environmentalists are far less likely to kill than those organizations inspired by religious ideologies. Larger organizations and those with more alliance ties are more likely to kill, while others are too “dilatory” and unserious about the “terrorist enterprise” to become lethal.
Details of opportunities for fellowship funding from the UK Research Councils:
The cross-Council programme focuses on the nature and interactions of five global issues: conflict, crime, environmental degradation, poverty and terrorism, and their implications for various concepts and contexts of security and insecurity. Within this framework, this fellowship call focuses specifically on how ideas and beliefs of individuals, communities and nation states relate to these five global phenomena.
Fellowship applications under this call must address one or more of the following key research areas:
- How do individuals and communities develop their ideas and beliefs about security and insecurity?
- Why do some ideas and beliefs lead to conflict, violence or criminal activity? What lessons can we learn… that provide the basis for countering those ideas and beliefs that reinforce conflict, violence and crime?
- How do issues around the cycle of knowledge production and use interact with the creation, management and resolution of insecurities?
- How are risks and threats communicated, constructed, represented and received by key actors and communities, using different media and cultural forms for different audiences, including the use of language, images and symbolism?
- Is there an acceptable balance between national security needs and the protection of civil liberties and human rights? If so, can one be secured? And how do we balance local needs against global responsibilities within a security context?
- How should institutions with responsibility for different aspects of a broad security agenda, including security forces themselves, evolve to meet new risks and threats?
It’s an exciting opportunity for researchers based in the UK, and the funding is also available to non-UK researchers looking for a chance to work at a UK institution:
Applications are open to both senior/professorial level researchers and to researchers at an earlier stage in their research career looking to achieve an international research leadership role during the period of the fellowship (minimum 3 years post-doctoral, or equivalent, research experience). Applications from leading overseas researchers seeking to conduct research on a relevant topic at an eligible UK research institution will also be welcomed. Applications from researchers who have not previously worked on security issues but wish to apply their expertise to research in this more broadly construed security agenda are encouraged.
The deadline for applications is 25th September 2008. Many more details, including FAQs [pdf] and a programme overview [pdf] via the ESRC website.
From National Institute of Justice (via Docuticker):
Are [terrorists] much different from conventional criminals, who tend to commit their crimes close to home? Research has shown that traditional criminals are spontaneous, but terrorists seem to go to great lengths preparing for their attacks — and may commit other crimes while doing so. How long does this planning take? And do different types of terrorist groups vary in preparation time?
To help answer these questions, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) launched a series of projects to explore patterns of terrorist behavior.
More here. PDF here.
Gabriel Weimann (2008). The Psychology of Mass-Mediated Terrorism. American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 52, No. 1, 69-86
The growing use and manipulation of modern communications by terrorist organizations have led communication and terrorism scholars to reconceptualize modern terrorism within the framework of symbolic communication theory. Some applied the theater-of-terror metaphor to examine modern terrorism as an attempt to communicate messages through the use of orchestrated violence. This article examines the psychological importance of the mass media for modern terrorism, the media tactics of terrorists, and the challenges they present to media organizations and governments. Special attention is given to the use of the Internet by modern terrorists and the rhetoric of terrorist Web sites based on 8-year-long monitoring of terrorist presence on the Internet and the analysis of more than 5,000 terrorist Web sites. Finally, the article concludes with various responses of modern democratic societies to the challenge poised by media-oriented and media-savvy terrorists.
In the latest issue of the Journal of International Criminal Justice, Armando Spataro, coordinator of the Antiterrorism Department of the Milan Prosecution Service offers his thoughts on why people turn to terrorism. Here’s the abstract:
Undeniably the marginalization suffered by many Islamic emigrants (particularly from North Africa) and the consequent difficulties in fitting in the land of adoption, constitute contributory causes — of a socio-economic nature — of their drift into terrorism. However, a distorted view of the principles of Islam and a violent and criminal interpretation of the obligation of Jihad constitute the main factor of their drive. Statements made in the course of interrogation by arrested terrorists (especially by supergrasses, referred to in Italy as ‘repenters’) as well as ideological documents disseminated internationally on the internet or items seized in the course of various judicial enquiries consistently show that the religious view of the world, obviously in the distorted perspective specific to terrorists, constitutes the main reason for their behaviour, whereas practically no importance attaches to the aspiration to liberate specific occupied territories or oppressed peoples. Another possible motivation, at least for suicidal acts, is linked with those of an economic nature: in connection with various judicial investigations it has emerged that sums of money collected as voluntary contributions from the ‘faithful’ serves not to finance the ‘terrorist act’ as such, but to guarantee a future for family members of a suicide attacker, or someone who died in the course of a terrorist action.
Reference:
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: Volume 31 Issue 8 is now online and includes the following articles:
- Rethinking “Wana”: A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conflict in the Tribal Region of Pakistan - Rabia Aslam
- Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict - Donald J. Reed
- Faith in the System: Conceptualizing Grand Strategy in the Post 9/11 World Order - David Malet
- Terrorist Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping: Using Script Theory to Predict the Fate of a Hostage - Minwoo Yun; Mitchel Roth
- Democracies Fighting Ethnic Insurgencies: Evidence from India - Shale Horowitz; Deepti Sharma
Report from U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, via Docuticker:
During the 110th Congress, under the leadership of Chairman Joseph Lieberman (ID-CT), the Committee continued its investigation into the threat of domestic radicalization and homegrown terrorism inspired by violent Islamist ideology. The Committee has held five more hearings exploring a range of subjects, including an assessment of the homegrown threat in the United States, the European experience with domestic radicalization, the federal government’s efforts to counter the homegrown terrorist threat, the role of local law enforcement in responding to the threat, and the Internet’s role in the radicalization process.
More here. PDF here.
Recent publication from the RAND Corporation:
During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. British government officials and military forces proved proficient at defeating or controlling these rebellions. However, these uprisings were much less complex than the modern jihadist insurgency. Past insurgent movements were primarily monolithic or national in form, had very specific local goals, and derived most of their power from the local population. These limitations made past rebellions vulnerable to strong military responses. In contrast, the modern jihadist insurgency is characterized by its complex and global nature. Unlike past insurgent forms that aspired to shape national politics, the jihadist movement espouses larger thematic goals, like overthrowing the global order. The modern jihadist insurgency is also more global in terms of its popular support and operational territory. It makes far better use of communications technology and propaganda to reach the minds and hearts of global audiences. The contemporary international security environment has therefore become a frustrating place for Western powers. Despite great technological and military advances, British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. Operational failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for the West to rethink and retool its current COIN strategy. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations.
More here, including access to previous reports in this series. PDF here.
From University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series via Docuticker:
This paper examines three cases in which people suspected of terrorist activity were questioned by Australian police and security officers. They are located in the context of fundamental shifts in criminal justice processes and principles. Debates about interrogating terrorist suspects are dominated by concerns about torture. It is argued here that such concerns need to be supplemented by paying more attention to everyday questioning in the increasing mass of ‘ordinary’ terrorist cases.
PDF here.
New from RAND:
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa’ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa’ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa’ida.
More here, and download the full report via here.
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict - Pathways toward terrorism and genocide is a new journal launched this year, edited by Clark McCauley. Volume 1 Issue 1 is open access and contains the following articles:
- Radicalization in the Persian Gulf: Assessing the potential of Islamist militancy in Saudi Arabia and Yemen - Mohammed M. Hafez
- Jemaah Islamiyah’s radical madrassah networks - Justin Magouirk; Scott Atran
- Responding to asymmetric threat: The dual-use strategy - Eugene B. Skolnikoff
- Terrorism in the year 2020: Examining the ideational, functional and geopolitical trends that will shape terrorism in the twenty-first century - Paul J. Smith
- Self-sacrifice as innovation: The strategic and tactical utility of martyrdom - Jeffrey W. Lewis
- Conflict resolution in asymmetric and symmetric situations: Northern Ireland as a case study - James W. McAuley; Catherine McGlynn; Jon Tonge
Via Medical News Today, 4 Jul 2008.
There is no evidence that young terrorists are mentally ill, a leading authority on terrorism has claimed at the Annual Meeting of the Royal College of Psychiatrists.
Professor Scott Atran, research director in anthropology at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris and presidential scholar in sociology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, also said there was no evidence that terrorists have personality disorders, are brainwashed by radical imams in mosques or Islamic religious schools (madrassahs), or enticed by the thought of scores of virgins waiting in heaven.
Professor Atran said radicalism was a social problem, rather than a mental health or criminal problem, and that young militants need superheroes to lead them away from the paths of jihad and terrorism.
Full story here.
Via Medical News Today, 3 Jul 2008.
People caught up in terrorist attacks or natural disasters are more resilient, both as individuals and in groups, than previously thought.
Far from being passive “victims” they can be highly organised survivors, so much so that they should be involved in drafting mental health guidelines to deal with major disasters.
Richard Williams, professor of mental health strategy at the University of Glamorgan, was speaking at a symposium on conflict and mental health at the Annual Meeting of the Royal College of Psychiatrists at Imperial College London on 2 July.
Full story here.